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Rawls on Justice, Well-Being, and the Stability of Justice

Fri, October 1, 10:00 to 10:30am PDT (10:00 to 10:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Rawls’s argument for the congruence of justice and well-being in Chapter Nine of A Theory of Justice is widely considered a failure that did not survive his transition to Political Liberalism. I reject this view by reconstructing the relationship between congruence, stability, and the sense of justice. The relationship between these three concepts has often been construed in the wrong terms. But once we put the relationship in the right framework, the perceived problem of Chapter Nine disappears and re-emerges as an important component of Political Liberalism.

My exegesis focuses on two distinctions in Chapter Nine. The first is a distinction between stability as successful social cooperation and stability as the endurance of just laws. The second is a distinction between a person who supports just laws for the sake of justice and a person who supports just laws for the sake of some other ends. The former Rawls describes as someone with an effective sense of justice. The latter I shall describe as someone with an ineffective sense of justice.

With these two distinctions on hand, I argue that Chapter Nine represents Rawls’s attempt to address the problem that persons with an ineffective sense of justice pose to stability as the endurance of just laws, when they are the majority in society. The problem is that they may use their social power to resist just laws that do not serve their ends, and they may express their resistance by supporting legislators who will revise or even abolish those laws on their behalf. The danger, then, is that just laws that importantly serve the ends of the minority, future generations, or non-members of society, are waylaid in the course of legislation. Rawls’s solution to this problem turns on his concept of stability as successful social cooperation. He argues that persons are more likely to cooperate in society (such as to pay their tax) if they understand that just laws, when observed, promote everyone’s good or well-being, even if cooperation involves discounting one’s contribution to one’s future well-being (as in the case of taxation, which implies a discount on one’s future well-being). Understanding the compatibility—or congruence—of the fairness of just laws with everyone’s good, in contrast with blindly observing laws without understanding, is Rawls’s solution to the two problems of instability. It explains his emphasis on the role of education and socialization in cultivating a society of persons with an effective sense of justice. Social cooperation is more likely to be successful when members understand the congruence of the fairness of laws with everyone’s good. And continuous successful social cooperation—from one generation to the next—secures the conditions for stability as the endurance of just laws.

Once we are clear about the intent of Chapter Nine, we can start to appreciate how Rawls modifies the arguments of Chapter Nine for Political Liberalism. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls conceives of a person with an ineffective sense of justice as a prudentially just person: the prudential person supports just laws for the sake of some other ends, and these ends are all related to self-regarding reasons of the good. Unlike the just person, the prudentially just person regards principles of right as standing in an aggregative relation with other considerations, and therefore allows principles of right to be outweighed by prudential considerations in all-things-considered judgment. Rawls does not dismiss prudentially just persons as persons without a sense of justice. But he worries that they could revise or overturn just laws that are less beneficial from their point of view. Because prudentially just persons are not decisively persuaded by reasons of the right to support just laws, the congruence thesis explains how they might be persuaded by self-regarding reasons of the good. In Political Liberalism, Rawls expands the circle of persons with an ineffective sense of justice to include persons who support just laws for the sake of some other ends—but their ends are tied to other-regarding reasons of the good. In Rawls’s terms, these reasons are “doctrinal” reasons. Because “doctrinally” just persons are not decisively persuaded by reasons of the right to support just laws, the congruence thesis explains how they might be persuaded by other-regarding reasons of the good.

The political upshot of the congruence thesis is the importance of appealing to prudential and doctrinal reasons for action in the politics of persuasion. If citizens with an ineffective sense of justice are representative of humankind, then the stability of justice (in both senses of "stability") crucially turns on the ability of statesmen to communicate the goodness of justice. Citizens with an ineffective sense of justice may reject just laws otherwise perceived as incongruent with their prudential or doctrinal values. But properly educated, they may perhaps support just laws for reasons of the good.

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