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Arendt’s interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and politics in the Western tradition is based on her interpretation of Plato, who, in her view, achieved the unprecedented separation between opinion and truth through a willful manipulation of his own philosophy for political purposes.
This manipulation consisted in three steps: 1) the introduction of the unprecedented opposition between opinion and truth, which Plato presented nonetheless as axiomatic, 2) an attempt to transform the current Athenian conception of politics, by questioning the validity of persuasion and denouncing opinion as a form of untruth, and 3) the manipulation of his own philosophy, the “deformation” of the doctrine of the ideas, in order to present the latter as capable of providing truth-based standards applicable to human affairs.
However, Arendt’s interpretation of Plato is simply wrong. There is no opposition between opinion and truth in Plato’s writings. The former is never equated with untruth, and nor is persuasion. Moreover, there is in Plato no “deformation” of the doctrine of ideas, or any doctrine, for that matter. Instead, the ideas are always presented tentatively as an opinion.
Arendt's misconstrual of the relationship between opinion and truth in Plato, and therefore also in the tradition, I argue in my paper, is the reason why her theory of judgment remained inconclusive. Scholars believe that, drawing mainly from her lectures on Kant’s Critique of Judgment, and the “subjective” kind of validity that aesthetic judgment facilitated, Arendt would have finally been able to address the question of the relationship between philosophy and politics without falling into the so-called anti-political Platonic “trap” of making ultimate appeals to truth, if it were not for her untimely death.
However, Arendt's theory of judgment, and the concept of “enlarged vision” on which it is based, could not have been concluded because it derives, not from her highly idiosyncratic reading of Kant, but from her investigations on Socrates. And what Arendt praised in Socrates – that he had nothing to teach, that he possessed no truth, that he cared about human affairs and simply meant to improve the opinions of others – is in fact the reverse image of her (mis)portrayal of Plato. The shortcomings of her critique of Plato are the shortcomings of her defense of Socrates (which she simply presents as its antithesis), which in turn are the shortcomings of her theory of judgment, by means of which no validity claims can be made.