Just Do It: Characteristics and Effectiveness of Chinese Economic Sanctions

• In Event: Chinese Politics Mini-Conference: China on the Global Stage: Policies and Reactions

Abstract

While U.S. economic sanctions are publicly announced, Chinese economic sanctions tend to be private, unannounced, and physical. Most Chinese sanctions adhere to the motto of “just do it,” which seems puzzling, given the signaling purpose of sanctions. What explains the private and physical aspects of Chinese economic sanctions, and under what conditions are they effective? The sanctions literature tends to focus on OECD countries. Using primary Chinese-language documents and interviews with former Chinese officials, I examine the characteristics, rationale, and effectiveness of Chinese economic sanctions. I argue that Chinese decision-makers rationally choose the “just do it” route for the following reasons. First, private and unannounced sanctions give China plausible deniability and help it evade institutional constraints such as WTO rules while creating uncertainty and ambiguity, that is, harsher actions will come if the target does not comply. Second, by imposing economic sanctions instead of making threats, China achieves greater demonstration effects, signaling not only to the target but also potential challengers. Third, by using “sticks” against the target and giving “carrots” to its neighbors, China turns commercial actors in the target against itself. That is, China is exercising a “divided and conquer” strategy. These three characteristics also make Chinese sanctions effective. The paper shows that 1) private sanctions can evade institutional constraints, and 2) physical sanctions, just as military coercion, are more effective in compellence and deterrence.

Author

• Ketian Zhang, George Mason University