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Variable Resilience: Law-Making During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Four Western Democracies

Thu, September 30, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

This paper analyses the process of law-making in France, Germany, Ireland and Israel during the first 18 months of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020-21).
In the first part we will present evidence from a descriptive analysis comprising two main parts: (a) a comparison of the way parliamentary procedures and practices were adapted in the context of the pandemic. (b) Based on a framework of delegation in parliamentary systems of government, we will compare how the chambers’ majorities (as ‘principals’) have delegated powers to governments and executive agencies. This will include information on the extent to which governments relied on primary legislation, including ‘omnibus legislation’, supplementary budgets, secondary legislation and decrees. A content analysis of relevant pieces of primary legislation will compare the extent to which the parliaments granted discretion to the relevant executive bodies and retained a realistic chance of revoking delegated powers through sunset clauses and other means of legislative control and the extent to which legislation included reporting duties and allowed post-legislative oversight and evaluation. Our findings confirm that the four parliaments under study were able to adapt existing rules and practices to the critical conditions under the pandemic. Contrary to post-parliamentary views echoed in the media, the legislatures we analyze have been able both to adapt to special sanitary and political circumstances and to rely on established practices and procedures. In this sense we observe a high degree of continuity and resilience.
In the second part, we will start with a brief descriptive account of the duration of the legislative process in Covid-related legislation (compared to other legislation) including the time made available for the detailed scrutiny of bills in legislative committees. We will then use multivariate analyses to explain variations in the duration of law-making for all bills passed in the relevant chambers and the reliance on secondary legislation and decrees, distinguishing between Covid-related and other bills. We will test hypotheses derived from a model which combines indicators capturing the external pressure on governments (level and change of infections reported and popular satisfaction with government performance). The core of the explanation, however, will be a model of delegation that seeks to capture preference heterogeneity among all institutional and partisan veto players on the one hand and the governments’ agenda powers in the legislature (both of which may vary by policy area) on the other. Hence the focus will be on the vulnerability of governments to internal disagreement within the government parties hypothesizing that strong governments constrained by few veto players will legislate faster and allow more parliamentary scrutiny whereas vulnerable and heterogeneous governments will seek to avoid gridlock by delegating powers to the executive.

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