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Why do states in the developing world often have an uneven capacity to enact policy in their territory? I argue that the level of national state presence in a given region is the result of the political resources that subnational elites have to resist the advancement of central-state institutions. Specifically, these resources are: (a) whether the subnational elites manage to unite in a common front, around a strongman or a local party, and (b) whether they count with independent bases of popular support. My theory derives from the study of Mexico’s post-revolutionary years, particularly, the expansion of national primary education. I analyze four paradigmatic cases representing different scenarios of subnational resistance to state-building and test my theory against alternative explanations.