Clientelism and Formal Political Institutions in Developing Countries

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The literature on clientelism has traditionally focused on who is targeted (e.g., Stokes et al. 2013) and the economic consequences (e.g., Keefer and Khemani 2004), paying less attention to how clientelistic practices interact with formal political institutions. In this panel, we examine the extent to which clientelistic practices affect—or are affected by—formal political institutions across different contexts. The first two papers consider how clientelism shapes the outcomes of and confidence in representative institutions. Combining qualitative and quantitative data from Argentina, Daby and Mosley examine how informal aspects of clientelistic practices affect the impact of formal gender quotas on political representation. The second paper considers the impacts of such clientelistic practices on voters’ perspectives. Kao and Lust, employing a conjoint experiment in Malawi and Zambia, find that explicitly clientelistic offers lead voters to be skeptical of politicians’ future performance. The following two papers in this panel treat clientelism as a dependent variable, considering how aspects of the political environment affect the practice of clientelism. Examining Uganda, Larreguy and Woller examine whether increased political competition discourages clientelism. The fourth paper, by Justesen and Hariri, employs an instrumental variable approach and survey data from South Africa, finding that the information environment determines the likelihood of political parties employing clientelistic practices. These papers employ a wide variety of research methods and original data. Overall, they contribute to our understanding of the relationship between clientelism and formal political institutions in the developing world.

Sub Unit

• Division 12: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries

Individual Presentations

• Informal Inequalities: Gender, Machine Politics, and Representation in Argentina - Mariela Szwarcberg Daby, Reed College; Mason Wallace Moseley, West Virginia University

• Signal of Strength? Clientelism and Expectations of Politicians’ Performance (Pre-Recorded) - Kristen Kao, University of Gothenburg; Ellen M. Lust, University of Gothenburg

• Distributive Politics in Competitive Vote Markets: Evidence from Uganda - Horacio Alejandro Larreguy, Harvard University; Anders Woller, University of Copenhagen

• Information and Clientelism - Mogens K. Justesen, Copenhagen Business School; Jacob Gerner Hariri, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

Chair

• Dominika Koter Colgate University

Discussant

• Adam Michael Auerbach American University-SIS