Criminal Politics in Brazil

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Criminal conflict in Brazil is not solely observed through violence. Though Brazil consistently ranks at the top of global violence indicators—at times registering more deaths than interstate or civil wars—this is but one of the ways in which criminal groups fight for power. Criminal groups are also embedded in politics, elections, and local security structures, aided by corruption and partnerships with politicians or the police. There is a rich literature on how and why organized criminal groups use violence to protect their economic goals. Yet scholars of organized crime and violence have only recently begun to analyze the ways in which organized criminal groups use violence politically, exploit corruption, and make deals with members of the state to further their economic or political goals. Absent from many of these works is an analysis of the incentives of state actors (politicians, police officers) that facilitate criminal violence or corruption. These recent studies suggest points of overlap and tension at the juncture of the literature on criminal violence and elite behavior in efforts to theorize why and how state actors engage with criminal groups.

Why do politicians cooperate peacefully with organized criminal groups? Why do politicians use violence against other politicians? What is the relationship between campaign spending limits and criminal violence? How can corruption make criminal groups stronger? This panel tackles these and related questions by bringing together a diverse group of scholars to present new research on organized crime across four different elements of Brazilian politics. Panelists will present papers that use a range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies for studying this phenomenon.

Bullock studies nonviolent cooperation between criminal groups and politicians, studying why and how candidates make deals with criminal actors in exchange for votes. Carvalho looks at political assassinations and the impact of corruption on politically motivated killings. Nieto-Matiz and Skigin focus on a possible unintended consequence of a campaign finance reform that could lead to criminal funding of political campaigns. Varsori grapples with the role of police corruption in strengthening criminal groups and making them more resilient.

Panelists will be joined by chair Stahlberg and discussants Arias and Franco Vivanco, who lend their expertise and diverse methodological approaches to the study of criminal conflict and violence in Brazil.

Sub Unit

• Division 21: Conflict Processes

Individual Presentations

• Machine [Gun] Politics: Why Politician Cooperate with Criminal Groups - Jessie Bullock, Harvard University

• The Political Economy of Assassinations - Mariana Carvalho, University of California, San Diego

• Campaign Spending Limits and Criminal Violence in Brazil - Camilo Nieto Matiz; Natan Skigin, University of Notre Dame

• A Bite with No Teeth: How Repression and Corruption Made Rio’s Gangs Tougher - Andrea Varsori, University of Huddersfield

Chair

• Stephanie Gimenez Stahlberg Johns Hopkins University

Discussants

• Enrique Desmond Arias Baruch College, CUNY

• Nicholas Barnes University of st Andrews