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Alliance Strategies: How States Manage Their Security Alliances

Fri, October 1, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The waning of the United States’ “unipolar moment” has led some observers to rethink the structure, value, and purpose of American alliances, both within the United States and in allied countries. Donald Trump’s presidency typified this trend, with many U.S. allies responding to Trump’s skepticism of U.S. alliances by seeking greater autonomy and hedging against the possibility of abandonment. Moreover, even with a change in leadership in Washington, D.C., there may not be a quick and durable snapback of trust between the United States and its allies, as there is no guarantee that future leaders will not change course again. Under the circumstances where domestic political actors embrace radically different views of international security alliances, promoting pluralism – this year’s conference theme – requires a deeper, bipartisan understanding of what security partners do (and can do) to manage their alliances.

Alliance treaties are certainly among the most powerful signals of political and military support that states can send, but many issues of great importance to alliance members are negotiated long after alliance treaties are signed. Moreover, states are keenly aware that due to a lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in international relations, there is no guarantee that their partners will honor written commitments in crisis and war. Hence, the importance of understanding what states do ex-post – i.e. after their alliances were formed – to manage their security relationships.

Taking states rather than alliance contracts as the unit of analysis, the papers on this panel give insight into what states do to maintain, manage, and strengthen their alliances (e.g. coordinating policies toward third parties; bargaining over the distribution of costs and benefits in the partnership) while hedging against uncertainty and potential abandonment. Blankenship’s paper illuminates a delicate balance between controlling and arming allies, and it provides evidence for U.S. ambivalence about burden-sharing with important allies. Fanlo’s paper shows that when a patron suddenly becomes less willing to provide security, weak allies are likely to wish to ‘re-align’ with a former adversary rather than doing what is predicted by realist theories – bandwagoning. Fukushima discusses four different strategies that weak allies may employ to maximize “benefits” from their security relationships in sneaky ways, and two of the four strategies may be used by vulnerable allies to rekindle their patron’s interests in the security partnerships. Gannon explains conditions under which alliance member states feel secure in engaging in a division of labor with each member specializing in particular capabilities rather than pursuing a full spectrum combined-arms military.

These four papers collectively contribute to a much deeper understanding of what states do to manage their alliances, while also illuminating what great powers might gain or lose by opting for deeper engagement versus retrenchment.

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