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Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel
Though coercion is inherent to authoritarian regimes, these regimes are also regularly responsive to the demands of their citizens. Responsiveness, or “the extent to which officials in the regime adhere to the demands of societal actors” (Chen, Pan and Xu 2015), has been recognized in online petitioning systems to quasi-democratic institutions to the selective toleration of protest. Responsiveness can advance political and economic goals, and, importantly, is one of the few avenues by which authoritarian citizens can influence policy-making outside of democratic consultation. Despite its importance, responsiveness in authoritarian regimes is still poorly understood. Questions remain about why, in some regimes, responsiveness is more institutionalized while in others, it appears particularistic and reactive. Similarly, the implications of responsive policy-making for individual officials are unclear: why and to what extent do unelected officials have incentives to respond to citizens’ demands? Last, it is important to consider how authoritarian citizens react to attempts at responsiveness by governments that have dramatically circumscribed the extent of public influence in policy-making. To explore these questions, this panel brings together papers on responsiveness in China, Vietnam and Russia.
In the first paper, Nhu Truong examines the historical origins of authoritarian responsiveness by comparing divergent patterns of state formation in China and Vietnam. Her findings explain why, in Vietnam, the government’s response to unrest related to land expropriation is institutionalized, whereas in China, it is more reactive. Edmund Malesky et al’s paper seeks to understand officials’ incentives to respond to citizens in single-party regimes. Malesky and coauthors use an experiment to show that parliamentarians in Vietnam who are more informed about constituents’ preferences are more likely to speak in parliament, suggesting that even in a single-party regime, electoral accountability still drives responsive governance. The third paper, by Tianguang Meng et al, explores the political incentives that lead local officials in China to preemptively respond to online petitions. These public sources of negative information simultaneously reveal poor performance to superiors and risk spurring protests, which can in turn impact political survival and post-retirement well-being. Via these incentives, public opinion can facilitate accountability despite the absence of competitive elections. The final contribution, by Sasha de Vogel, considers how protesters react to promises of future policy accommodation. Using data on protest campaigns from Moscow, Russia, she shows that concessions are often followed by a decrease in large protests, suggesting that many protesters find these promises credible and acceptable, even if a core of activists do not.
Authoritarian Expropriation and Responsiveness in Vietnam and China - Nhu Truong, Denison University
Experimental Evidence on Electoral Accountability in Single-Party Regimes - Edmund J. Malesky, Duke University; Jason Douglas Todd, Duke Kunshan University; Anh Tran, Indiana University, Bloomington
Online Petitions, Responsiveness and Risk-Averse Political Selection in China - Chao-yo Cheng, Birkbeck, University of London; Tianguang Meng, Tsinghua University; Zesen Yang, Tsinghua University
Quality, Quantity, & Credibility: Concessions & Demobilization in Moscow, Russia - Sasha de Vogel, New York University