International Order and Repertoires of Power Politics

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Every instance of power politics is shaped by a choice of distinct instruments that states, and other actors, draw on – such as sanctions, cyber attacks, bilateral treaties, military exercises, peace talks, hybrid warfare, investments and development aid, and arms sales.
We see power-political toolkits as having a family resemblance to what Tilly called “repertoires of contention.” He suggested that how groups engaged in making claims, and in doing contentious politics, followed more or less “standardized, limited repertoires” (Tilly 2008: xi).

How do these repertoires of power politics affect international order? The US-led liberal international order, to the extent that it is a single thing at all, affects a huge number of political behaviors. From trade openness to military alliances to debt crises, policymakers invoke the concept of international order across a vast range of issue areas. Scholars contest even the basic concept of international order, let alone the meaning of “liberal” order or its causal effects. Yet chances are good that, whichever international topic one chooses to analyze, it relates to some form of international order.

This panel seeks to make sense of international order across a variety of different subsystems and issue areas. One paper, by Jeff Colgan, introduces the concept of subsystems: a collection of states and non-state actors linked by a single question of authority within an issue area like trade or finance. Borrowing from John Ikenberry’s (2000) definition of international order as “the governing arrangements among a group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions,” Colgan argues that international order exists within subsystems. He explores the instruments of power politics used in global oil politics, which he divides into two principal subsystems.

Other papers address diplomacy, signaling, and great-power subversion. Marina Henke looks at the repertoire of diplomacy and, in particular, the use of diplomatic ties to organize collective action. Jen Spindel investigates states’ repertoires for signaling, especially how to credibly communicate that state A is a friend, and that state B should not take any action against it. Bill Wohlforth examines how governments resolve the trade-off between external and subversive statecraft, a trade-off that must center on the meaning and strength of the sovereign norm and its non-intervention corollary. He asks: why do great powers choose to violate each other’s sovereignty in peacetime?

Together, these papers provide new insights on how power politics shape international order, and generate change in the absence of major power war.

Sub Unit

• Division 19: International Security 

Individual Presentations

• Partial Hegemony, Oil, and International Order - Jeff Colgan, Brown University

• The Repertoire of “Diplomatic Embeddedness” - Marina Elisabeth Henke, Northwestern University

• Signaling Repertoires: Beyond Costly Signaling vs Cheap Talk - Jennifer Spindel, University of New Hampshire

• Great-Power Subversion in the Power-Political Repertoire - William C. Wohlforth, Dartmouth College

Chair

• Daniel H. Nexon Georgetown University

Discussants

• Ayse Zarakol University of Cambridge

• Stacie E. Goddard Wellesley College