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Time in International Relations

Sat, October 2, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

What is the role of time in international politics? The panel attempts to tackle this question from a variety of theoretical and methodological standpoints, bringing multiple understandings of time to the discussion. These range from time as the notion of time horizons, which describe how far into the future a state looks when considering the consequences of its actions, to simple discount rates, which capture the weighting of present versus future benefits, to the conceptualization of certain processes as dynamic over time rather than static. Daniel Drezner inquires what affects the time horizon of great powers in an anarchical system, and what kinds of power-augmenting policies are likely to trigger negative or positive feedback. His paper suggests that certain dimensions of power demonstrate far more structural resiliency to revisionist challenges than others. Paradoxically, the very resilience of these structures permits rising great powers to adopt a longer time horizon and challenge pre-existing hierarchies without triggering negative feedback. In a related vein, David Edelstein’s paper addresses different temporal dimensions of threats and how states might attempt effectively to balance them. While the international relations literature has at times thought about how states manage when confronting multiple threats, this literature has not addressed the temporal dimension of this challenge—how states manage threats that simultaneously exist along multiple time horizons. He provides a theoretical account of this and an empirical examination of U.S. efforts to manage threats at different temporal distances in the post-Cold War period. Shifting to a time-as-discounting lens, Max Kuhelj Bugaric examines how patience affects the credibility of different signals; namely, the key idea here is that not so much that signals sent by a state will be the wrong signals—as in, the sender will not know how to send a long time horizon signal—but rather that the credibility of the signal will be undermined by the internal characteristics of the sender state. These range from the level of the individual to groups, organizations, publics, society, and regime type. Eleonora Mattiacci further enriches the discussion about time in IR by introducing to it the concept of dynamic processes. She argues that relations between countries are often volatile, shifting inconsistently between cooperative and conflictual acts. Volatile states’ behavior is thus the outcome of an interaction between dynamics unfolding both at the domestic and the international level: the unbridled competition among domestic groups and a state's relative power superiority. Thus, rather than being dismissed as capricious behavior on the part of powerful states, volatility should be understood as the outcome of a classic political struggle for resource redistribution.

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