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Politics of Rulemaking in the Administration State

Fri, October 1, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Session Submission Type: In-Person Created Panel

Session Description

What affects rulemaking in the administrative state? Lee and You examine the role of interest groups in policymaking. Testing their theory using data on lobbying activities and the career trajectories of bureaucrats in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative from 1997-2017, Lee and You find that lobbying groups are less likely to engage in the agency’s policymaking process if individuals connected to them become bureaucrats of that agency, suggesting that a decrease in interest groups’ political activities might not imply that their influence on policymaking is diminished. Shafie examines the deregulation of environmental policies during the Trump administration. Analyzing a dataset of proposed and final rules from various agencies, Shafie assesses the resilience of environmental policies during the Trump presidency and potential changes under the new Biden administration. Silfa focuses on legislative influence in rulemaking. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency, Silfa shows that House members are more likely to comment on a proposed rule shortly after receiving donations from a corporate political action committee that has an interest in the same rule, with the effect strongest for House members in electorally vulnerable districts. Rashin and Richter examines the rise of citizen participation in rulemaking. Leveraging a dataset of all public comments of proposed rules at the Securities and Exchange Commission since 1994, Rashin and Richter analyze the extent to which the increased volume of comments received is duplicative, which proposed rules receive them, and what the implications of such comments are on final regulations.

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