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Session Submission Type: In-Person Created Panel
To what extent does presidential politicization and the budget affect appointments and federal agencies? Gibson examines the use of centralization-the creation of policy in the White House-and politicization-use of political appointees-during the Trump administration. Leveraging new measures of centralization and politicization based on a 2020 survey of government executives and employees, Gibson finds find that the Trump Administration systematically engaged in higher levels of both centralization and politicization than the Obama and Bush Administrations. Limbocker, Richardson, and Selin assess the consequences of politicization and agency structure on federal employment. Analyzing a new dataset of agency structure and government employees from 1973-2019, Limbocker, Richardson, and Selin explore how agency structure and appointments change and interact over time to influence internal agency operations and how agency environment affect civil servants’ decision to remain in or to leave government service. Resh, Napolio, and Lee examine the influence of discretionary agency outlays on the relative length of Senate-confirmed presidential appointee (PAS) vacancies over time. Resh, Napolio, and Lee argue that discretionary spending outlays to the senator’s state, the degree of agency responsiveness to the Senate, and ideological conflicts between the agency and the Senate affect the duration of PAS vacancies over time and test their theory using data from George H.W. Bush through Donald Trump. Gui and Rothenberg assess how the importance of appointment positions affect presidential nomination and bureaucratic politicization. Gui and Rothenberg find that presidents are more likely to make compromises in appointing someone to positions with greater discretionary budget impacts and that such positions are more likely to move through the Senate confirmation process more smoothly.
Centralization, Politicization, and the Trump Administration - Nathan Gibson, Princeton University
The Consequences of Politicization and Agency Structure for Federal Employment - Scott Limbocker, United States Military Academy; Mark D. Richardson, Georgetown University; Jennifer L. Selin, University of Missouri, Columbia
The Distributive Benefits of Senate-Confirmed Appointee Vacancies - William G. Resh, University of Southern California; Nicholas G. Napolio, University of Southern California; Keunyoung Lee, University of Southern California
The Importance of Position: Agency Budgets and Executive Appointments - Peng Gui, University of Rochester; Lawrence S. Rothenberg, University of Rochester