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Session Submission Type: Virtual Roundtable
Methods are distinct (e.g., social choice, cooperative game theory, non—cooperative game theory, single-actor decision theory, straight constrained utility maximization, and etc.). The method is a subject of choice by the author as she adopts the axiomatic structure that underpins the model and the solution concept.
Different methods might produce models with different predictions even if based off the same narrative.
Are there rules for choosing which method to use? Generally not without a clear narrative prior to modeling. Some methods are ‘thinner’ than the narrative (e.g., if strategic interaction in the story, social choice will probably not get the result). Then the model that is thinner than the narrative will be underspecified in this – choice of method - sense; non-strategic methods can often be underspecified. The method might also be ‘thicker’ than the useful narrative, adding unnecessary complexity to the model and reducing its generality (e.g., use of game theory to explain strategic voting at individual level when can use social choice).
Some methods will produce existence where others won’t.
The importance of uniqueness: are methods that lead to an excessively large set of predictions useful for anything?
How does ‘measurement error’ in assumptions about the preferences compare across the main methods?
The model needs some dramatic tension: conflict over outcomes, or mixed motives, or observation of a bad outcome, or choice without enough information.