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Great Power Competition (GPC) has become a cornerstone in recent US grand strategy, but, as a concept, has received a lukewarm reception from scholars, many of whom dismiss it as indistinguishable from the ordinary push-and-shove of world politics. We argue that GPC is, however, a different game altogether, for two reasons. First, GPC is not a Hobbesian competition among all great powers — rather, it is an exclusive contest between specific rivals that generates particular alignment patterns. Second, the game’s objective is not survival, but supremacy in a given system or subsystem. Because supremacy requires constant and sustained effort, competition is necessarily strategic, and incentivizes a holistic approach. Devising that holistic approach is the essence of grand strategy: marshalling all available resources to enhance, sustain, or recover a competitive edge in a struggle that is permanent, compulsory, and pursued in both peace and war. Great powers therefore must develop grand strategies that link goals; means and ways; and responding to the moves of rivals and third-party great powers. Because the contest is dependent on the great power’s relative power and status, three archetypes emerge: rising powers aim to facilitate gains in the competition; status-quo powers aim to maintain their position; and declining powers aim to minimize—or reverse—losses. The paper elaborates these archetypal grand strategies and illustrates them with reference to contemporary China, the US, and Russia.