The Conditions of Armed Group Taxation: When Do Rebel Groups Tax Civilians?

• In Event: Explaining the Causes and Consequences of Rebel Governance

Abstract

Given that civilian taxation is one of the most prominent activities of armed groups, this paper examines the structural conditions that determine when an armed group may or may not tax. While taxation is a popular activity of armed groups, some groups opt not to engage in this revenue raising activity. If armed groups are driven by maximising profit, why might they not pursue this revenue raising opportunity? The central question of the paper, then, is under what conditions do rebel groups tax civilians?

This paper examines three macro-level factors determine whether an armed group is more likely to tax civilians: 1) a strong revenue imperative; 2) an opportunity to develop a civilian tax base; and 3) whether it is feasible to tax civilians. The paper measures the impact of access to non-tax revenue, state and bureaucratic administrative capacity, and relative military strength on the propensity of an armed group to tax civilians by using data on armed group civilian taxation covering 140 armed groups. Ultimately, the findings suggest that so long as a group has an opportunity to tax civilians, and it is militarily feasible, it will do so even despite easily available, and often more lucrative, revenue by other means. This then suggests that taxation by armed groups serves more than a revenue maximizing purpose, and proposes that future research re-thinks the role of armed group taxation in civil war and investigates the political drivers and dynamics of armed group taxation.

Author

• Tanya Bandula-Irwin, University of Toronto