Explaining Presidential-Solicitor General Amicus Curiae Brief Policy Alignment

• In Event: Poster Session: State Politics and Policy & Law and Courts
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Law and Courts

Abstract

Under what conditions can the solicitor general write an amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court that differs from the president’s preferred policy position? Research suggests that amicus curiae briefs written by the solicitor general align with, but do not always directly mirror, presidential policy preferences and that there is intra-administration variation in ideological disposition of solicitors general. This project proposes a theory explaining the conditions under which solicitor general amicus curiae briefs should align or depart from presidential policy preferences. Specifically, I explore how issue salience and other factors shape the ‘discretion window’ afforded the SG during the briefing stage. I test this theory through text and content analysis of amicus curiae briefs from 1984-2018. The findings have implications for our understanding of ideological drift, presidential and solicitor general influence at the third branch, and the separation of powers more generally.

Author

• Audrey Baricovich, University of Kentucky