How Local Election Timing Impacts Government Spending and Taxation

• In Event: Local Government Institutions and Political Representation

Abstract

Low and uneven turnout is a serious problem in American democracy. And nowhere is that problem worse than at the local level where turnout is both exceptionally low and highly skewed toward Whites, the well-off, and older Americans. This project assesses the impact of one potential reform – a move to concurrent local elections that are held on the same day as national contests - on outcomes in local democracy. Studies have shown that a shift in election timing can greatly expand turnout and make voters more representative of the public. But to date little research has been able to assess the impact of election timing on the degree to which local government spending and taxation mirrors the preferences of more disadvantaged interests. We address this omission by using existing variation in local election timing to assess the impact of on-cycle elections on the degree to which cities spend on redistributional functions like welfare, housing, and education, and the degree to which cities rely on progressive taxes (eg property taxes) or regressive taxes (eg sales taxes) for funding. Using a panel study of all California cities over a recent 15 year period and employing city and year fixed effects, we find that timing has a profound effect on how governments spend and raise their money. When cities shift to concurrent elections, government spending and taxation policies shift to the left and falls more in line with the preferences of racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged segments of the local population.

Author

• Zoltan L. Hajnal, University of California, San Diego