Clash of Clans: How Local Politicians Shape Insurgent Conflict

• In Event: Violent Actors and Threats to Local Democracy

Abstract

How do local electoral politics influence counterinsurgency effectiveness? Previous research has largely conceptualized counterinsurgency as being conducted by a unified national government motivated to expel insurgents. In reality, certain local elected officials benefit from an alliance with insurgents, undermining national government attempts to establish military control. Specifically, I argue that the control of political dynasties (clans) over local politics inhibits national government attempts to effectively conduct counterinsurgency. Political clans rely on insurgent presence to strengthen their hold on local power and, in return, use their political influence to subvert national government attempts to eliminate insurgent presence. While clans are able to slow national government attempts to win military control from insurgents, their strong grip on power also results in reduced violent incidents due to lower levels of contestation. I test this theory using a regression-discontinuity (RD) design of close elections in the Philippines involving mayoral candidates associated with political clans, paired with data on insurgent presence (from military intelligence reports) and conflict-related violence over the 2009-2015 period. The results suggest that, contrary to the “hearts and minds” literature that focuses on ordinary civilians, local political elites are the key lynchpins of counterinsurgency success or failure.

Author

• Dotan Haim, Florida State University