Election Cycles and Targeted Repression in Brazil

• In Event: Popular Mobilization and State Violence in Latin America

Abstract

How do leaders vary repression targeting over election cycles? Existing literature finds that countries with competitive elections tend to repress less that authoritarian countries. However, there is limited work to examine whether democratic leaders’ incentives to repress vary with election timing and across different groups. We theorize that leaders’ electoral incentives to repress vary based on which groups are perceived as security threats in different domestic regions. Specifically, we argue that approaching elections increase leaders’ incentives to repress threatening groups in order to demonstrate their ability to provide security to voters. We evaluate the relationship between election timing, threat perception, and repression using a dual empirical strategy in Brazil. First, we evaluate patterns of targeted repression against different opposition groups over election cycles at the subnational level using novel events data. Second, we test the mechanisms of our argument using a survey experiment to evaluate how threat perception influences voting choice across regions and repression targets.

Authors

• Leonardo Fernandes, University of Pittsburgh

• Kelly Elizabeth Morrison, University of Tennessee, Knoxville

• João V. Guedes-Neto, University of Pittsburgh