Bureaucratic Shuffling, Regime Type, and Public Good Provision

• In Event: Poster Session: Comparative Politics II

Abstract

Provincial governors are essential for the exercise of power in a polity. Why do some political rulers engage in frequent shuffling of their governors while other rulers have their governors serve longer terms? We develop a theoretical framework arguing that shuffling of governors reflects the level of (in)security of a government that is shaped by the regime type. More specifically, we contend that shuffling is less frequent in (1) democratic regimes compared to authoritarian ones and (2) durable authoritarian regimes compared to less durable ones. We also argue that a revolving door approach to provincial governance is associated with worse outcomes in public good provision. We test these propositions on an original dataset of all Ottoman and Turkish governors from 1876 to 2019. Statistical analyses show that democratic governance and durable authoritarian regime tend to have more stability in provincial governance and frequent shuffling of governors undermines public good provision.

Authors

• Bogdan Gabriel Popescu, University of Oxford

• Yusuf Magiya, Columbia University

• Güneş Murat Tezcür, Arizona State University