The Representation Trap: How and Why Muslims Struggle to Maintain Power in India

• In Event: The Politics of Identity in South Asia: Ethnicity and Caste

Abstract

Challenging a conventional wisdom that power begets power, this paper argues that political gains for marginalized groups can create the very conditions for their political demise. When a marginalized group comes to power without institutional protections such as quotas or reservations, it can divide the marginalized group and unite the dominant group. I study this process, which I call the representation trap, I focus on the over 200 million Muslims in India who represent one of the world’s largest marginalized groups in the world’s largest democracy. While India has made strides toward the political inclusion of many marginalized groups, Muslims stand in stark contrast, experiencing poor political representation, low socioeconomic status, and communal violence. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that a Muslim political win leads to a 30 percent lower likelihood of subsequent Muslim victory. I document the mechanisms for marginalized group divisions and dominant group consolidation through additional election analyses, experimental evidence from an original, in-person survey of about 5000 Muslim and Hindu voters, and qualitative evidence drawing on about 150 elite and voter interviews. Taken together, the theory and findings challenge the perspective that representation necessarily catalyzes the political empowerment of marginalized groups

Author

• Feyaad Allie, Stanford University