Online Public Deliberation and Authoritarian Survival

• In Event: Poster Session: Health Policy and Politics & Information Technology and Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Information Technology and Politics

Abstract

What are the impacts of digital participatory institutions on authoritarian survival? Previous research claims that by mimicking deliberation channels and responsiveness in democracies, authoritarian rulers can increase regime legitimacy among the public. Yet, so far we have little empirical evidence to support this claim. This paper shows that rather than increasing regime support among all citizens, government responses of different qualities have divergent impacts on citizen support and political participation. Using original data of over 1 million citizen online speeches before and after they submit an appeal to government-run petition accounts on Weibo (Chinese equivalent of Twitter), I find that obtaining a substantive response—response that resolves the appealed problem—motivates citizens to speak more positively of the Chinese regime and increase appeals through government-run channels. Receiving no response or a symbolic response—response that is rhetorical without solving the appealed problem—motivates citizens to speak more negatively of the regime initially, but after three months, this oppositional expression decreases to a level lower than that before the appeal. Recent study shows that the Chinese regime selectively provides substantive responses to citizens who demonstrate higher conformity to the regime's surveillance and censorship policies on Weibo. In this way, my findings suggest that upon observing this selective responsiveness of the government, unsuccessful petitioners exhibit more politically conformist behaviors in the short term in order to get a better response. That said, the failure to obtain substantive response also motivates these petitioners to reduce appeals through government-run channels and instead, seek more coordination with other societal actors (e.g. civil lawyers, opinion leaders on Weibo) for political petitions, which has the potential to destabilize the regime in the long term.

Author

• Tongtong Zhang, Stanford University