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The underlying motivation for this paper is the recognition that the struggle against corruption not only lies in the building of trust but also manifests itself differently in different contexts – be they among different countries, policy areas, and societal groups. Trust is a tool for reducing corruption, rather than simply the outcome of anti-corruption measures, and trust, itself, is also context-specific. (In Taxes and Trust: From Coercion to Compliance in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (2018), I demonstrated that the rare relationships that the state forms through trust with taxpayers help accomplish a particular policy outcome.) Through a uniquely layered methodological approach, this paper will delineate more clearly how such differences emerge to provide for a better conceptualisation for comprehending how corruption can be placed under better control.
Across the East of Europe, most states today are either democracies with low levels of corruption or authoritarian states with high levels of corruption. However, three key states – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – find themselves in neither of these categories and, instead, possess as much democracy as their neighbours in the eastern part of the EU and as much corruption as in Russia and other neighbouring states to their East. In addition to being caught geopolitically between Russia and the West, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine do not have politically stable systems for the long run – that is, either democracy will become more firmly rooted and challenge existing limited access orders enjoyed by state elites or corruption will degrade and derail the democratic pathway. As such, it is critical to understand how and whether citizens, states and elites learn to trust one another to reduce corruption – defined here as the misuse of (entrusted) powers or position for private gain, initiated either by the public or private sectors, that precludes the equal treatment of citizens. Moreover, given the prevalence of corruption in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine today, it is crucial to compare them to neighbouring states such as Estonia, Poland, and Romania, which have had more relative and varied success in reducing corruption.
So, under what circumstances would citizens, elites, and the state trust each other to make the state less corrupt? As current academic thinking on corruption and trust highlights the critical utility of two distinct types of trust – social trust, or social capital, which focuses on the trust among members of a society; and institutional trust, which focuses on citizen trust to the state – as necessary preconditions for reducing corruption, this paper will test the origins and relative weight of each type of trust for discouraging corruption across Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in comparison to the relatively less corrupt cases of Estonia, Poland, and Romania. If there is a need for trust building between state and society for there to be less corruption, what is required is a check as to whether such trust can be built, which forms of trust (social trust or institutional trust) matter more and in which policy areas can increased trust help establish a more durable social contract accompanied by less corruption.
To explain precisely how trust matters means engaging with factors along at least six different vectors: (1) country; (2) social vs institutional trust; (3) elites vs general public; (4) policy areas; (5) general views on corruption; and (6) prior personal experiences with the state. With respect to (4), the main hypotheses regarding under what circumstances some citizens and governing elites trust each other to make the state less corrupt will be tested through four key policy areas – public services, tax collection, law enforcement and the judiciary.
To measure these variables, I am employing this summer a general public attitudinal survey in each of the six countries. These surveys examine the nature of relations between state bureaucrats and citizens on the ground and who, why and how society trusts. The surveys focus on the perceptions, experiences, and tolerance of corruption as well as on citizen perceptions of others’ experiences to measure levels of social and institutional trust within each policy area. Questions about petty bribery and corruption – and whether it acts as a social lubricant – will be employed with respect to each policy area to assess citizen views on corruption, perceived fairness, and social trust. Traditional measures of trust in government will be compared to unique measures such as trust in the vaccines that the government provides its citizens – critical in this pandemic year.
In short, this paper will delineate the variation in social and institutional trust as well as identify opportune pathways for reducing corruption across four policy areas affecting the general public, elites, and state actors in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in light of the experiences of Estonia, Poland, and Romania.