Congressional Expectations of Presidential Self-Restraint

• In Event: Rethinking Conceptions of Presidential Power (Virtual Session)

Abstract

A core expectation of the presidency literature is that presidents are power-maximizers. Presidential power seeking is expected to be persistent, clear, and observable empirically. By contrast, instances of the chief executive exercising self-restraint are harder to identify. We propose to address this challenge by shifting the analytical focus: To what extent does Congress explicitly or implicitly rely on presidential self-restraint in statute? In this paper, we examine the different kinds of self-restraint expectations Congress has set or assumed in laws affecting presidential power in the 20th or 21st centuries, including legislation concerning appointments (i.e. nominations, removals, vacancies), policy discretion (i.e. over tariffs, emergency declarations), agenda setting (i.e. over budgeting), and administrative expertise (i.e. over intelligence, science). We examine the legislative history behind such laws – especially congressional hearings and debates – to determine the expectations that legislators themselves had of how presidents would act.

Authors

• John A. Dearborn, Vanderbilt University

• Jack Greenberg, Yale University