Centripetal Elections

• In Event: Centripetal Democracy in America: Ranked Choice Voting in Theory and Practice

Abstract

Debate about the comparative virtues of electoral systems takes place mostly between empiricists; this paper contributes some crucial insights from recent work in the political theory of representation and then argues that some system of Ranked Choice Voting is likely the best system in most places.

It begins by developing a rich, but still empirically tractable, conception of democratic responsiveness that incorporates ideas from political theory: first, a Rawlsian emphasis on the way systems affect the least advantaged citizens, second, a deliberative attentiveness to discursive modes of responsiveness (in addition to the “aggregative” forms usually studied by empiricists); third, a “constructivist” awareness of the way electoral systems help shape the preferences, identities, and interests of citizens (Disch 2011; Saward 2010); and, finally, an attempt to evaluate electoral arrangements in light of ways they influence broader systems of representation, including informal and non-electoral forms.

With the help of this updated conception of responsiveness, I develop a new account of the central virtues of majoritarian and proportional systems. The central virtues of the former are their legibility: the fact that they inculcate broad programmatic appeals and to assemble big coalitions of less powerful citizens. The primary virtue of the latter systems is inclusion-promoting networked responsiveness between representatives in more and less powerful parties, who have slightly weightier incentives to respond to under-represented groups. (For instance, the descriptive representation of women is normally better in proportional systems, in part because they create more competitive pressure for big parties to emulate minor party rivals who choose women as candidates (Matland and Studlar 1996).)

The paper concludes by arguing that Ranked Choice Voting systems may be generally desirable in most places. This argument builds on the idea that the trade-offs between different electoral systems can be viewed as an optimization problem (Carey and Hix 2011) with a solution that realizes “the best of both worlds” (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001) – and also on work on “centripetalism” is divided societies (Horowitz 1992). Some forms of RCV can combine the benefit of majoritarian and proportional systems because the tend to create simple single-party governments (or pre-electoral coalitions) while granting a meaningful electoral role for minor parties as recipients of first-preference votes and hence also important contributors to debates at election time. Australia has combines legible government and clarity of responsibility for outcomes with programmatic competition between disciplined and more-or-less centre-seeking parties but has also institutionalized patterns of networked responsiveness via practices of vote-swapping (Reilly 2001; 2018). Crucially, it has also created a politics that is notable for its moderation (with some glaring exceptions that may in fact prove the rule). RCV produces a “centripetal” electoral politics of programmatic competition in which group differences are respected and responded to but in which there is constant institutional pressure on representatives to avoid divisive appeals and build large coalitions. It promotes valuable systemic processes of deliberation and aggregation benefiting not only the median, but the worst off.

Author

• Daniel Hutton Ferris, Newcastle University