Centripetal Innovations in the United States: The Case of Final Five Voting

• In Event: Centripetal Democracy in America: Ranked Choice Voting in Theory and Practice

Abstract

Centripetal theory was pioneered as a prescription for divided societies facing deep and polarizing identity cleavages (Horowitz 1985, 1991). It advocates political reforms and strategies that give politicians incentives to reach beyond their base and court the support of voters from across identity schisms, even in divided or polarized societies. US politics today routinely exhibits indicators of such identity-based polarization, with high levels of social, informational, and residential segregation amongst voters; heightened campaign rhetoric, policy ‘outbidding’ and “us versus them” narratives by politicians; and migration from or abandonment of the political center by political parties (one of which appears increasingly ambivalent about competitive democracy itself).

Given this, there is increasing focus on changing the rules of the game to address the dysfunction of the ‘politics industry’ (Gehl and Porter 2020). This paper examines one such proposal – “Final Five Voting” – which advocates replacing party primaries by open contests between all parties, with the five best-supported primary candidates going on to compete in a ranked choice vote general election. Analysed from the perspective of centripetal theory, this combination of institutional features may interact in unexpected ways and create new avenues for addressing polarization, not only by promoting more centrist outcomes but also by generating intra-party factionalism, inter-party bargaining and cross-candidate coalition-building.

Authors

• Benjamin Reilly, East-West Center

• David Lublin, American University