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The recent years have seen waves of developing countries filing anti-dumping cases against Chinese imports, which at times have led to hefty tariffs levied against Chinese imports. On the other hand, China has rarely filed anti-dumping cases against a few countries, despite the size of their imports entering China’s domestic market. Why did not China retaliate against developing countries filing anti-dumping cases by filing its own? And why did China file anti-dumping cases against specific countries in a given year?
We answer these questions by demonstrating the politics of China’s use of anti-dumping measures. Specifically, we show that to the dismay of domestic producers, China’s anti-dumping case selection entails considerable political considerations – China’s allies or strategically important actors were often not at the receiving end of China’s anti-dumping measures. In contrast, China is likely to have used these measures to pressure countries embroiled in diplomatic tensions. The value of imports from a given country plays a relatively small role in the process. We argue the findings can be generalizable to other regimes where decision-making is centralized, and policymakers have control over a range of policy instruments.