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Party politics in Iraq since 2003 are often explained by the demographic factor focusing on sectarian/ ethnic differences. However, ethno-sectarian factor doesn’t explain the difference of the supportive bases among the intra-sectarian political groups, which is often wider than inter-sectarian discrepancies. The difference of patterns of the electoral campaign and of fielding candidates among the major political parties/ electoral coalition reflects diverse specificities of their supportive base, which may differ according to the social and historical characteristics of each constituency. This paper analyses how the social and historical diversity of the constituency affects the behavior of the political parties in their electoral campaign and fielding candidates in Iraq, focusing on their strategy in the electoral campaign; how do they organize gatherings for voters, which kinds of local notables do they invite to public meetings, how do they visit voter’s family, and/or receive them at candidates’ offices or houses in order to listen to their claims and demands, and how do they inspect the people's living conditions. I pick up the cases of Baghdad constituencies in the parliamentary election held in 2021, which can be representative of whole Iraq not only because of its ethno-sectarian heterogeneity but also because of the variety of origins of the residents in Baghdad as a result of vast rural-urban migration since middle of 20th century.
Analysis shows that Baghdad can be divided into two areas, one of which is fully dominated by the al-Sadr bloc, and the other under competition among various political parties, which emphasize their ability to distribute wealth and social services, their connection with established elite circles as well as with tribal networks, and highlighting their military capacity. It shows the rivalries between two different images of representation, i.e., “young, highly educated with professional knowledge, but amateur, unknown, and inexperienced in the existing political arena” of al-Sadr, and “enough experience in central government and local politics, or tribal leaders with traditional influence” of established ruling elites.
This division shows the fact that there remains no room for the previous middle / upper class, which had occupied a large part of the society in Baghdad during the 60s-80s, to be represented in the current political situation. The upper class in the previous regimes disappeared and was replaced by new elite circles under the post-2003 regime. Decomposition of the middle class in the 90s and after 2003 paralleled with the military destruction under the 2006-7 civil war of the mixed districts and some areas once have been distributed for government officials and army during 60s-80s. While post-2003 political parties, no matter whether they have been in a ruling position or in opposition, are no more capable to reflect the voices of the voters in Baghdad, a non-negligible number of independent candidates and protest-oriented activists challenged both incumbent ruling elite circles and movement organizations which represents migrated urban poor in this election, although new political figures are yet to be matured.