Demobilization through Inaction: Bureaucratic Delay and Collective Action

• In Event: Frontiers in Historical Political Economy

Abstract

I develop a theory of how bureaucratic delay can act a substitute for repression or accommodation in response to citizen mobilization. By taking partial but incomplete steps toward a policy goal sought by citizens, authorities can create uncertainty about the timing and eventual outcome of mobilization. This makes it difficult for citizens to organize in response, encouraging eventual demobilization. I examine the predictions of the model using original archival data on the processing and outcome of over 4,000 community petitions for land redistribution in early 20th-century Mexico. I show that bureaucratic delay often succeeded in defusing agrarian conflicts, that this strategy became more common when and where the costs of repression and redistribution increased, and that villages with a longer history of collective action were more able to secure political concessions in short period of time.

Author

• Emily A. Sellars, Yale University