Institutional Change and Shifting Legislative Role Orientations in Autocracies

• In Event: Consequences of Political Parties and Organizations in Autocracies

Abstract

Comparatively, less is known about individual legislators in autocracies. Do they respond similarly to the institutional features of political competition, as do their parallels in established democracies? Do the district magnitude or the candidate selection process impact whether they are more accountable to the constituency rather than the party? This article examines these questions with an original survey of Cameroon's 9th National Assembly members. The survey uses multidimensional ranked-choice questions to measure a key concept from the comparative literature on legislatures – legislative role orientations. Cameroon also provides unique leverage since it has strategically altered district magnitudes and experimented for a time with local primaries. The results show that the district magnitude has little impact on legislative role orientations. However, decentralized candidate selection processes push legislators to orient more strongly with the constituency's interest. These findings provide novel views into the inner workings of authoritarian legislatures.

Author

• Yonatan L. Morse, University of Connecticut