Party Origins, Elite Defection, and Autocratic Breakdown

• In Event: Consequences of Political Parties and Organizations in Autocracies

Abstract

Although dominant parties are conducive to preventing autocratic breakdown, recent studies also suggest that party-based dictatorships may also collapse through elite divisions generated by political appointments and decisions on rent distribution. This article explores the conditions under which elite divisions lead to regime change in party-based dictatorships. We argue that whether elite divisions lead to regime collapse depends upon the historical origins of ruling parties. Using the V-Party dataset, we show that elite divisions within the ruling party decrease the levels of democratization and the risk of authoritarian breakdown when ruling parties originate from ideology-based conflicts. Findings suggest that dictators can use strong partisan ties to maintain elite cohesion among loyalists and legitimize the use of repressive measures to deal with defectors even if elite divisions occur. Consequently, elite divisions fail to credibly challenge the government and make it difficult for opposition figures and activists to effectively rally against the extant regime.

Authors

• Adrian del Rio, Center for East and International Studies

• Masaaki Higashijima, University of Tokyo