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How and Why Legislators Respond to Citizens in Times of Crises

Fri, September 16, 2:00 to 3:30pm, TBA

Abstract

Do crises facilitate responsiveness among legislators given the high levels of saliency and “rallying around the flag” sentiments that result from these conditions? Or do they rather exacerbate existing patterns of weak and differential responsiveness given the information overload that legislators face and executive dominance? In this paper, we empirically explore this issue and also ask about the mediating role of the electoral connection. Particularly, we ask whether nominally elected legislators tend to respond more frequently and more non-discriminatory to unsolicited constituency mails compared to legislator elected via party lists. We further ask whether MPs representing the government coalition tend to be more responsive compared to their colleagues representing opposition parties. To answer these questions, we conducted a field experiment with all members of the German Bundestag during the second phase in the Covid-19 crisis in November and December 2020. In this experiment, fictitious constituents voiced concern about the economic and societal impact of the pandemic and asked legislators what they and their parties are planning to do to get German citizens through this crisis. In the experiment, legislators were contacted by different types of constituents such as partisans vs. non-partisans and upper-middle class vs. lower-class constituents. This not only allows to gauge aggregate level responsiveness and their electoral prerequisites, this also allows to explore systematic biases in mass-elite interactions, i.e. differential responsiveness and how this interacts with electoral motivations. Germany’s mixed-member electoral system and its parliamentary mode of governance provide a most likely case for a role of individual and collective vote seeking concerns in times of crisis.

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