Meritocracy and Politicization in a Weberian Bureaucracy: Does Insulation Work?

• In Event: Revisiting Bureaucracy in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

The selection model and career incentives of public administrators matters greatly for the performance of a bureaucracy. It affects the quality-of-service provision, the magnitude of waste and corruption, and the capacity to innovate. In this paper we leverage massive micro-level administrative data and a novel survey of candidates to enter the civil service in Spain to illuminate key questions about the degree of meritocracy and politicization in the selection and career advancement of civil servants. Focusing on the higher bodies of the Spanish bureaucracy, we have conducted a novel survey of candidates to these positions with the goal of uncovering the sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes of those who compete and those who eventually enter the civil service. Moreover, we have extracted massive data from the Spanish Official State Bulletin to trace the career trajectories of all civil servants from four elite bureaucratic corps to estimate the degree of politicization and meritocracy in their career. These comprehensive data allow us to analyze the successes and limitations of Weberian selection systems, the mechanisms of the politicization of the civil service, and the progress and obstacles to the diversification of bureaucracies (particularly with regards to gender, disability, and class). In so doing, the paper will contribute to policy and societal debates about the civil service, its representativeness, and its autonomy from the political sphere.

Authors

• Pablo Fernandez-Vazquez, Carlos III University

• Victor Lapuente, Goteburg University

• Guillermo Toral, IE University