A Balance of Weakness: Explaining Democratic Survival in Contemporary Peru

• In Event: Democratic Stability and Backsliding

Abstract

The present article offers a novel explanation for the survival of democracy in contemporary Peru. Since the early 2000s, Peruvian democracy has remained in place when other Latin American countries fell into different kinds of non-democratic regimes. However, the country lacks all the structural, institutional, cultural, and agency-based foundations (or prerequisites) for the survival of democracy. Peruvian party-system is highly fragmented, state institutions are historically among the weakest in the region, openly authoritarian leaders head both the government and the opposition, citizens are increasingly favorable to authoritarian measures, and there is an ongoing economic crisis. On top of that, the last five years have seen a deep political crisis resulting in presidential instability (i.e., four presidents succeeding one to another) and an apparent attempt to break the democratic rule that ultimately failed.

By applying a process-tracing approach, the article rules out major theories on democratic continuity in favor of an explanation that builds upon theories on authoritarian survival. It argues that Peru is a democracy only because of its inability to produce an authoritarian regime. Indeed, the politics of institutional weakness produces actors, including several authoritarian leaders, who lack material and non-material sources for disciplining power-holders, avoiding dissent, and cracking down the opposition.

While most theories explain the existence of democracy based on a “balance of power” between actors, the theory advanced in the present article is best conceptualized as one based on a “balance of weakness.” Peruvian democracy will survive as long as all actors remain weak enough to balance each other.

Author

• Daniel Encinas, Northwestern University