Career Incentives and Policy Congruence in the Administrative Courts

• In Event: Poster Session: Experiments in Political Behavior & Public Administration & Canadian Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: The Emerging Issues in the Modern Administrative State

Abstract

We examine the relationship between policy congruence in the agencies comprising the U.S. bureaucracy and judicial decision-making. Typically, agencies house administrative law judges (ALJs) to adjudicate a variety of legal matters arising in those institutions. While agencies can hire ALJs from outside the government, most agencies are known to hire judges from the Social Security Administration (SSA), which houses the largest group of ALJs in the government and acts as a feeder for the placement of ALJs throughout the bureaucracy. To assess the dynamics of this process wherein ALJs move around the federal bureaucracy, we compile ALJ disposition data and federal personnel records to examine the behavior of judges who have switched agencies and those that who have not. We find agencies are more likely to hire judges who conform to the policy objectives of an agency and current administration and that, over time, the judges themselves in some cases may align their decisions with an administration's policy preferences to attract an agency's attention. These findings contribute to literatures on judicial and administrative politics by highlighting how agencies strategically hire to advance their policy preferences, the nature of judicial decision-making outside of the Article III courts, and the role of promotion-seeking behaviors in judicial and administrative contexts.

Authors

• Alexander Bolton, Emory University

• Sara J. Heridia, Emory University