Meeting, Everyone? Parties’ Linkage Strategies in (Non-)Competitive Elections

• In Event: Challenges in Developing Party Systems

Abstract

Parties (and their candidates) are expected to make strategic choices regarding their constituencies' mobilization during electoral times(Koole & van Praag, 1990, p. 56). Such choices range from choosing the issues their campaign will focus on, framing their messages, and selecting their target audience. About the latter, should the party target core voters, or should the party target non-core voters? Conventionally, we expect parties will focus on core voters and a single (unified) message (Kitschelt, 2000). However, researchers have shown that parties often focus on the core and non-core voters and, crucially, that these voters are engaged differently but simultaneously (see, for example, Calvo & Murillo, 2019; Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014).
The use of multiple and different strategies to mobilize multiple groups of voters has recently come to the attention of party politics scholars. Nevertheless, our knowledge remains limited to the party level with little understanding about a) the pervasiveness of the use of multiple strategies across a given party system and b) whether parties’ strategies change when party system characteristics change, e.g., in more or less competitive systems. This paper contributes to filling this gap in our knowledge by presenting an analysis of the Ecuadorian party system in three different electoral years (2013, 2017, and 2021). We leverage an original database of Twitter data of messages posted by legislative candidates, presidential candidates, official party accounts, and the broader conversation around the Ecuadorian elections of 2013, 2017, and 2021. By analyzing the focus of the candidates’ electoral messaging and the variation of their messaging within and across parties, we can explore the strategies of all parties participating in the Ecuadorian elections. The Ecuadorian elections are ideal for exploring the use of multiple strategies to engage distinct groups of voters and the effects of a changing party system. We can leverage the presence of different types of parties and the changes in the party system’s characteristics in the three election years.
We use the concepts of expansive and defensive strategies (Sani & Sartori, 1983) to characterize parties' strategies to appeal to core and non-core voters (expansive strategy) or to appeal solely to core voters (defensive strategy). Building on our findings, we argue parties are more likely to employ expansive strategies when the party system is less competitive (e.g., under the control of one party). Parties reach beyond their core voters and increase the use of mixed strategies in a bid to differentiate themselves (party and candidates) from other competitors (Calvo &Murillo, 2019, p. 10), aiming for the support of floating voters. By contrast, when the party system becomes more competitive, parties tend to use a defensive strategy (i.e., seek to mobilize – and build – their core voters). A more competitive system complicates parties electoral calculations and leads them to protect supporters. In both instances, parties employ different combinations of appeals and employ different sets of these combinations to engage different voters. The diversity of appeals is reduced when parties employ a defensive strategy, while it increases as parties opt for an expansive strategy.

Authors

• Angelica Abad Cisneros, Universidad de Cuenca

• Raul Aldaz, Universidad San Francisco de Quito

• Diana Davila Gordillo, Lake Forest College

• Sebastian Vallejo Vera, Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey