Nauseating Displays of Ministerial Loyalty in Brazil, 2019–2021

• In Event: Executive and Ministerial Leadership

Abstract

The choice of ministers and political appointees occurs, both in democracies and dictatorships, through the evaluation of technical competence and political loyalty to the president or prime minister. Usually, political parties serve as information shortcuts regarding potential ministers’ policy preferences and presumed loyalty to the president.

However, less institutionalized party systems, like Brazil's, can render this mechanism useless, encouraging ministers to use other methods to signal loyalty to the president. We present a new measure of displays of political loyalty based on statements to the press by the members of president Jair Bolsonaro's cabinet.

We analyze how the president's “extreme” policy preferences – i.e., defense of the paper ballot– allows ministers to demonstrate ideological alignment with the president, possibly increasing the cohesion of the governing coalition.

Author

• Sergio Praca, Getulio Vargas Foundation