Mass Political Consequences of Partial Redistribution: Evidence from China

• In Event: Redistribution under Authoritarian Rule and Authoritarian Legacies (Virtual Session)

Abstract

Although it is well recognized that authoritarian rulers can introduce redistributive programs to placate grievances and cultivate political support, many of the programs are half-hearted, partial reforms that may fall short of expectations. What is the effect of partial redistribution on regime support? This paper addresses this question by focusing on the 2008 Labor Contract Law in China, where distributional outcomes of the law are usually offset in the process of judicial enforcement. I argue that the effect of partial redistribution can be decomposed into two components - backlash against unmet expectations and gains over status quo - and examine whether political rulers’ blame-shifting strategies can mitigate the negative effect of the backlash on regime support. Empirically, I employ a survey experiment to estimate the effect of partial redistribution on regime support and differentiate the two mechanisms of partial redistribution. By looking into the effectiveness of redistributive programs, this paper contributes to our understanding of the problem of authoritarian control and mass political effects of redistribution.

Author

• Hsu Yumin Wang, Emory University