A Disjointed-Decision Trap? Lessons from US Fragmented Federalism

• In Event: Federalism, Governance, and Accountability

Abstract

Federalism in the United States has been conceived in multifarious ways. It has served as a classic model of dual but also cooperative federalism. Additional concepts include ‘marble-cake’, ‘picket-fence’, ‘coercive’ and, increasingly, ‘fragmented federalism’. These concepts refer predominantly to relations between federal or national and state levels. Together they also reveal a fundamental ambivalence on how to conceive the dynamics and complexities of these relations. The US widely lacks constitutional institutional linkages between the states and the national government, nor are virtually any joint or common tasks prescribed, in contrast to systems of joint-decision making. Nevertheless, states have long established a variety of channels and a dense net of interaction with the federal government, as has been the case vice-versa. However, such linkages prove fragile and even conducive to increasing tensions and frictions, for one under conditions of political polarization, and for another given the lack of constitutionally prescribed cooperation, so that such political contestation can become exacerbated by constitutional politics. In reference to the joint-decision trap Scharpf (1988) famously conceived for explaining potentials for deadlock or sub-optimal decisions in systems requiring co-decision of constituent-unit governments at (supra-)national level, I propose to explore the inverse: How federal and state governments’ ability to conduct coordination and resolve cross-jurisdictional problems together may be hampered under decoupled, fragmented institutional conditions, leading to a ‘disjointed-decision trap’. As such, I also seek to draw potential lessons from the US case for further comparison.

Author

• Jared Sonnicksen, RWTH Aachen University