The Return of Conglomerates: The Political Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions

• In Event: Networks and the Effects of Mergers, Joint Negotiations, and Multilateral Aid (Virtual Session)

Abstract

Does consolidation affect corporations’ political interests and actions? Every year corporations expand through the creation or acquisition of new subsidiary companies. Despite the commonality of this practice, little is known regarding how it influences corporations’—and by extension, their subsidiaries’— political behavior. This paper attempts to characterize this effect by analyzing how subsidiaries shape both the avenues through which corporations pursue their political interests and the issue areas in which they seek to influence. To accomplish this, we first construct a historical dataset of acquisitions and mergers for a broad sample of the country's prominent corporations spanning various industries and sizes. We then combine this corporate history with three common yet distinct avenues of political participation: campaign financing (from the Federal Election Commission), congressional lobbying (from Lobbying Disclosure), and the filing of amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court (from Amicus Curiae Networks). For each of these practices, we also categorize the general policy or issue areas they address. Through social network, time-series, and comparative analyses, we analyze whether corporations, in response to their mergers and acquisitions, change their avenues of political influence, targeted issue areas, and collaborations. Our results provide a unique perspective on how subsidiaries and their parent corporations shape one another’s political actions and interests. This paper adds to our understanding of what motivates corporate political behavior and comes when large-scale corporate mergers are becoming increasingly common.

Authors

• Lucas Boschelli, Washington University in St. Louis

• Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Ohio State University

• Dino Pinterpe Christenson, Washington University in St. Louis