Revolution, Imperial Collapse, and Regional War in Russia and China

• In Event: Narratives, Ideas, and Ideologies in International History

Abstract

The collapse of the Chinese Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the Russian Romanov dynasty in 1917 both precipitated broader regional crises, including widespread violence. How should we understand this violence? And why, despite widespread disorder and violence after the revolution in both cases, was order restored relatively quickly in Russia but not in China? This article assesses these questions by contrasting the experience of the Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin to that of Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army. Whereas the Bolsheviks overcame opposition from White Armies, external interveners, and newly independent neighboring countries to consolidate power, Yuan failed to fully consolidate authority, and the Chinese state almost completely collapsed after his death in 1916, precipitating a period of internal disorder and violence that would not end until after the Communists seized power in 1949. I identify three plausible explanations for this difference: the unifying power of communist ideology in Russia, differing levels of external threat, and varying institutional choices made by leaders of the revolutionary governments, and argue that a combination of two of these factors account for the differing results. In the Chinese case, I argue that Yuan Shikai institutionalized his rule by balancing power among his supporters, a strategy that reduced threats to his rule but also created a leadership vacuum upon his death. By contrast, the Politburo under Lenin created a clear institutional hierarchy that, while not avoiding a leadership struggle upon Lenin’s death in 1924, ensured that that struggle would be conducted politically rather than militarily. I argue further that these differing strategies reflect the unifying role of ideology. Lenin, as the head of a movement of true believers, did not face serious internal threats to his hold on power. By contrast, Yuan, a late and uncommitted convert to a revolutionary movement that lacked the power of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, faced far stronger threats to his position. The internal divisions experienced in China, but not in Russia, then explain the persistence of violence in and around China over the subsequent decades: recurring civil wars during and after the warlord period inflicted misery within China and drew in China’s neighbors. I substantiate these claims through close analysis of relevant historiography, and conclude the article with a discussion of implications for scholarship on revolution, civil war, and regional violence.

Author

• Alex Weisiger, University of Pennsylvania