Targeting Allies? Deterrence, Disarmament, and NGO Activism

• In Event: Arms Control

Abstract

What explains states’ and INGOs investment of time and effort in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a disarmament initiative believed by many to be hopelessly naïve? I argue that the TPNW is an attempt at norm entrepreneurship by INGOs, seeking to alter the norms that treat nuclear deterrence as legitimate. However, it is likely that the threshold for a ‘critical mass’ of states accepting new norms that de-legitimate nuclear weapons is particularly high. Given resource constraints, INGOs must target states that are both persuadable (likely to accept new norms) and high-impact (receive material benefits from status-quo norms). In this paper, I test for evidence of preference convergence between states and disarmament INGOs. I measure state preferences surrounding nuclear disarmament by applying Wordfish, a method frequently used to estimate ideological preferences from text, to statements made at the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) conferences and at UN General Assembly debates on the TPNW. This measure places states along an underlying ideological dimension ranging from “status-quo” to “transformative” approaches to disarmament. Positions along this dimension are meaningfully distinct from those in more traditional disarmament fora, and state preference convergence with INGOs over time is predictive of future signature and ratification of the TPNW. I find evidence that INGOs target “high-impact” states, such as allies of nuclear weapons states. However, state characteristics expected to increase “persuadability,” such as democracy and location in a stable geopolitical neighborhood, are actually associated with movement away from INGO positions over time.

Author

• Miriam Barnum, Stanford University