Commanding Elites: Cabinet Politics and Economic Control in Rwanda

• In Event: Poster Session: Democracy & Autocracy

Abstract

The regime in Rwanda maintains power not simply by courting elites through basic patronage, but through a two-pronged approach which includes 1.) frequently shuffling cabinet portfolios; and 2.) regime dominance of the economy to internalize corruption. Cabinet politics in Rwanda is characterized by high turnover and frequent position changes. Whereas previous research on cabinet politics addressed the patronage elements of executive appointments primarily as a means of accommodating elites, this tool serves a different purpose for the regime in Rwanda. While rents can be directed to political elites through a variety of state-owned institutions and businesses, the cabinet functions as a mechanism of control over potential challengers. This strategy in Rwanda involves often arbitrary and capricious dismissals. Yet, the most interesting episodes of cabinet changes involve individuals being shifted from one ministry to another to prevent the development of power centers among elites. This usually indicates that individual’s perceived value to the regime, yet it also demonstrates a wariness of that individual’s potential power or rise in influence.

The regime also bolsters its durability through a complex strategy of economic dominance. Originating from a party-owned enterprise in the years immediately following the 1994 genocide, the regime has grown its economic empire to nearly every sector of the economy. With intent, the regime has secured businesses—through loss-making investments from public institutions to illegal asset seizures—which form backward and forward linkages in the economy, such that almost any transaction of meaningful size is funneled through some state-owned enterprise. The effect of this economic concentration by the regime is to position party insiders as the beneficiaries of public corruption under the guise of economic development. Additionally, the economic synergies pursued by the regime allow it to effectively launder foreign aid earmarked for heavy industry and infrastructure projects, as the state owns the dominant firms in everything from cement production to civil engineering and furniture manufacturing. Based on elite interviews over the period of 2018-2021, this research sheds light on the tools by which the regime in Rwanda maintains support from and control over political and economic elites. While Rwandan politics reserve some unique characteristics, the mechanisms studied in this project can help us understand regime behavior in other countries.

Author

• Michael E. Jones, Tulane University