Session Submission Summary
Share...

Direct link:

Political Recruitment and State Capacity in China

Thu, September 15, 2:00 to 3:30pm, TBA

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The Chinese bureaucracy under the CCP rule is generally regarded as strong and capable. Existing literature largely attributes this high state capacity to political selection; in particular, many studies focus on promotion and advancement within the government – its mechanisms and criteria – to examine the incentives facing government officials and their performance. In contrast, relatively little is understood about China’s political recruitment, i.e., entry-level selection, which has undergone significant reforms in the last two decades, as well as its implications on state capacity. Who wants to enter the government, and for what reason? Who gets selected? And how do they perform subsequently? These are the questions this panel seeks to shed light on.

The five papers on this panel speak coherently to the issue of political recruitment and its implications on state capacity, each examining a different avenue of entry-level recruitment. The Liu et al paper investigates the contemporary Civil Service Exam and what kind of individuals are likely to self-select into participation; the paper by Lu focuses on a special recruitment program that directly sends elite college graduates to local governments; the paper by Yi and Zhou tackles the question of membership recruitment by the CCP among college students; the Wang paper examines the performance of entry-level civil servants in Chinese localities; and finally, the Chen and Wilson paper emphasizes the Leninist structure of the CCP to explain cadre promotion. Together, these five papers bring empirical evidence to enhance our understanding of entry-level political selection in China today.

Sub Unit

Individual Presentations

Chair

Discussant