Nuclear Alliance Restraint: Success and Failure to Stop Allied Proliferators

• In Event: Nuclear Proliferation and Counterproliferation

Abstract

Why do powerful states sometimes fail to halt their minor allies’ nuclear armament, but achieve success in other occasions? This paper builds a theory providing a novel answer to this question. It posits that the varying outcomes of the powerful nations’ efforts hinge crucially on two structural factors: (1) the number of the world’s superpowers and (2) geographical distance between the powerful states and their minor allies. These factors not only shape how much leverage the stronger states can marshal to restrain their weaker allies, but also affect how adequately (or fully) the available leverage is utilized. Building on this logic, we argue that successful restraint is probable in the situations where the global political system contains two superpowers and one of them attempts to rein in its remotely located ally. By contrast, failure is likely when the world has a single superpower or when nuclear aspirants are geographically proximate to their stronger ally striving to denuclearize them.

Authors

• Dong Sun Lee, Korea University

• Iordanka Alexandrova, Seoul National University of Science and Technology