The Role of Enforcement Expectations in Anti-Corruption Policymaking

• In Event: Bayesian Case Studies in International and Comparative Politics

Abstract

Under what conditions do politicians enact anti-corruption policies that threaten their interests and limit their discretion? This paper argues that political will for hand-tying reforms turns on lawmaker expectations of future enforcement. Lawmakers expecting weaker post-enactment enforcement are likely to adopt stronger anti-corruption statutes, while those anticipating aggressive enforcement are likely to eschew dramatic reform in favor of under-inclusive statutes. Through explicit Bayesian process-tracing, the study examines the drafting of prominent South Korean anti-corruption legislation from the early 2000s to the later 2010s. Legislative records and in-depth interviews conducted with South Korean lawmakers, bureaucrats, prosecutors, and judges, as well as an original dataset of more than 800 white-collar investigations conducted on elected officials show that early drafters were less likely to consider potential enforcement outcomes and more likely to adopt statutory criteria that broadened liability for elected officials. Lawmakers in subsequent National Assemblies, on the other hand, anticipated broad constructions of criminal statutes by prosecutors and judges, expunging language that allowed discretionary enforcement and in which the conduct of elected officials could be found liable. The findings underscore the roles of politician miscalculation and law enforcement in the design of self-binding institutions.

Author

• Adoree T Kim, Cornell University