Inherited Interventions: Presidents, Military Advisors, & Wartime Decisions

• In Event: Bayesian Case Studies in International and Comparative Politics

Abstract

Why do some newly inaugurated leaders intensify involvement in ongoing military interventions, while others wind down their predecessors’ wars relatively quickly? Several studies suggest that changes in political leadership coalitions liberate newly installed decision-makers from the domestic punishment their more culpable predecessors would expect to suffer from a military defeat or less favorable negotiated settlement. Yet several executives -- from Richard Nixon in Vietnam to Donald Trump in Afghanistan -- have opted to intensify involvement in interventions they inherit even after campaigning to wind down these wars. I argue that newly inaugurated political leaders, particularly those with little combat experience, will defer to preferences of senior military officers to avoid being perceived domestically as rejecting military advice early in their tenures. Given the well-established preferences of uniformed officers to intensify fighting in pursuit of victory, chief executives will prolong ongoing interventions to minimize domestic political risks of appearing to overrule the military brass. I evaluate my argument using explicit Bayesian process tracing and cross-case analysis of wartime decisions by political leaders whose forces fought in Afghanistan.

Author

• Theo Milonopoulos, Naval War College