States of Terror: Politics in the Shadow of Violence

• In Event: Novel Approaches to Studying Consequences of Repression

Abstract

The intended purpose of repression is to deter challenging behavior and compel obedience to the incumbent regime. Yet its observed effect is often the opposite, leaving some potential challengers undeterred while forcing others to feign loyalty by concealing their true preferences. In deciding whom to repress, regimes must choose an optimal evidentiary standard that would derail successful coordination by citizens. If the evidentiary standard is either too high or too low, every citizen with a grievance against the regime will act in opposition -- either because no one expects to be repressed, or because everyone expects to be repressed no matter what. The optimal evidentiary standard lies somewhere in between these two extremes. We argue that negative shocks to state capacity make regimes more likely to err on the side of a higher evidentiary standard, leading to more selective repression. When the regime's capacity to respond punitively to challenging acts declines, acting in opposition becomes a means for some citizens to escape repression --- either by replacing the regime or by using opposition infrastructure as a defensive shield. In the presence of this defensive motive, even otherwise loyal members of society may feel compelled to act in opposition, as a means of self-preservation. An exceedingly high evidentiary standard, in this scenario, generates fewer incentives for citizens to seek safety from coercion. We test this proposition with sub-national data on repression and dissent from 156 countries, and a meta-analysis of previous quantitative studies.

Authors

• Yuri M. Zhukov, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

• Arturas Rozenas, New York University