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Why do states abandon their wartime coalition partners? Prior research focuses on domestic politics, intra-coalition challenges, and battlefield circumstances to explain defection. I build on this work by arguing that domestically insecure leaders are constrained in their capabilities to maintain military engagement overseas and are highly likely to defect from coalitions. Rebellion and coups are serious domestic threats to political leaders’ survival. Therefore, coups and severe civil wars will cause state leaders to prematurely withdraw from coalition operations to bolster their security at home. An empirical analysis of coalition defections from 1950 to 2001 lends support to the expectation that vulnerable leaders are more likely to discontinue their contribution to coalition operations and redirect capabilities inward to consolidate their hold on power. This research contributes to the literature by linking domestic conflict and leadership insecurity to coalition defection and has important policy implications. Understanding factors driving defection helps policymakers gauge their allies’ degrees of reliability